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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the ordinance construed excepted drug stores for the sale of "drugs,
medicines, mineral waters, soft drinks, cigars and tobacco only," but the
ordinance in the principal case excepted drug stores furnishing enu-
merated items, not expressly limiting them to sales of such items only.
Whether a drug store could sell staple groceries on Sunday under the
ordinance the court does not decide, and it is open to question whether
the court would hold an ordinance discriminatory under such circum-
stances.
Ordinances such as the one considered in the Towery case seem to
place more significance upon the name of the business than upon what
business it in fact does. Where an ordinance excepts drug stores from
its operation, for instance, should a store still be considered a drug store
although its primary business consists of the sale of articles other than
drugs and medicines? It has been stated that at the present time "a
'drug store' could mean anything from a place where 'drugs alone are
sold to one where anything from an aspirin tablet to an automobile could
be purchased.22  It is submitted that the better Sunday closing ordi-
nance is one with a general closing provision and which does not except
particular kinds of businesses from its operation, but rather excepts only
enumerated articles or items which can be sold on Sunday.
23
CALVIN C. WALLACE
Negotiable Instruments-Defenses of Lack and Failure of
Consideration as Affected by Seal
In an action on promissory notes under seal, it was held that if the
'defendant could show a total failure of consideration, this would be a
good defense, since the presumption of consideration arising from the
seal is rebuttable.'
The origin of the seal is traceable to times when few people could
write, and accordingly identified themselves by the use of a distinctive
2' See Henderson v. Antonacci, 62 So. 2d 5, 10 (Fla. 1952) (concurring opinion).
23 Statutes with this type of classification have generally been upheld. State v.
Justus, 91 Minn. 447, 98 N. W. 325 (1904) ; State v. Diamond, 56 N. D. 854, 219
N. W. 831 (1928) ; People v. Zimmerman, 48 Misc. Rep. 203, 95 N. Y. Supp. 136
(Sup. Ct. 1904).
Under such a statute, it has been said that where tobacco and candy are excepted
from its operation, a large department store could open for the sale of those items,
although there is doubt whether it would be economically feasible for them to do
so. State v. Grabinski, 33 Wash. 2d 603, 206 P. 2d 1022 (1949).
Such an ordinance has been held arbitrary in permitting the sale of a can of
beer on Sunday, while prohibiting the sale of a can of orange juice or coffee.
Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Utah 284, 194 P. 2d 464 (1948).
" Mills v. Bonin, 239 N. C. 498 (1954). The distinction between want and failure
of consideration should be noted. "Want of consideration embraces transactions
or instances where none was intended to pass, while failure of consideration im-
plies that a valuable consideration, moving from obligee to obligor, was contem-
plated." In re Killeen's Estate, 310 Pa. 182, 187, 165 At. 34, 35 (1932).
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personal seal. This use of the seal as a means of identification antedated
the contract theory of consideration, and when that doctrine arose, the
exception of sealed instruments from its application became a part of
the substantive law.2
A clear statement of this exception was made in Walker v. Walker,'
where in an action on a sealed promissory note, the court stated that it
is "not aware of any rule of law by which a consideration is inferred from
the fact of the execution of a sealed instrument. No consideration is
necessary in order to give validity to a deed." 4 The presence or absence
of consideration apparently could not be inquired into, as none was
necessary;5 therefore, lack of consideration would be no defense to an
action on the note.
In several 'decisions subsequent to the Walker case the North Caro-
lina court states that "a note under seal imports a consideration," which
might mean that the seal only creates a rebuttable presumption, so that
lack of consideration, once proved, would be a defense to an action on
a sealed note." Regardless of what language it may use, however, the
court has uniformly reached the result that lack of consideration is no
'defense to liability on a note under seal. It would seem that this result
is against the weight of authority, which recognizes that the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law makes lack of consideration a defense
against anyone not a holder in due course in these cases.7  North Caro-
2 BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES 493 (Gavit ed. 1892); HoLmEs, THE CoMMoN
LAW 273 (1881).
335 N. C. 335 (1852).
4 Id. at 336.
'Ducker v. Whitson, 112 N. C. 44, 16 S. E. 854 (1893) (notes were intended as
a gift).Angier v. Howard, 94 N. C. 27, 29 (1886). Similar language is used in Cowen
v. Williams, 197 N. C. 432, 149 S. E. 396 (1929); Moose v. Crowell, 147 N. C.
551, 61 S. E. 524 (1908) ; Ducker v. Whitson, 112 N. C. 44, 16 S. E. 854 (1893).
In Webster v. Bailey, 118 N. C. 193, 194, 24 S. E. 9, 10 (1896), the court states
that "the law conclusively presumes that it was made upon good and sufficient con-
sideration' Burriss v. Starr, 165 N. C. 657, 81 S. E. 929 (1914), quotes the accu-
rate language of Walker v. Walker, 35 N. C. 335 (1852), and Harrell v. Watson,
63 N. C. 454 (1869), uses language similar to that in the Walker case. See 1
CoBIN, CONTRACrS § 252 (1950).
7 St. Paul's Episcopal Church v. Fields, 81 Conn. 870, 72 Atl. 145 (1909)
Italo-Petroleum Corp. of America v. Hannigan, 1 Ter. 500, 14 A. 2d 401 (Del.
1940) ; Citizens' Bank of Blakely v. Hall, 179 Ga. 662, 177 S. E. 496 (1934) ; Citi-
zens' Nat. Bank v. Custis, 153 Md. 235, 138 Att. 261 (1927) (all decided under the
NIL). Contra: Shinn et al. v. Stemler, 150 Pa. Super. 350, 45 A. 2d 242 (1946)(want of consideration is no defense, although failure of consideration is; case
decided in absence of NIL).
Lack of consideration would appear to be a valid defense, however, if the action
is brought in equity. The court in Woodall v. Prevatt, 45 N. C. 199, 201 (1853),
said that "while in law a seal imports a valuable consideration which is conclusive,
in equity a seal only raises a presumption of a valuable consideration which may be
rebutted." See Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N. C. 622, 97 S. E. 654 (1918). And
Dean Roscoe Pound has written, "although courts of equity are accustomed to say
they will not aid a volunteer, and will not give specific performance of a contract
under seal where there is no common law consideration, they enforce options under
seal." Pound, Consideration it; Equity, 13 ILL. L. Rav. 667, 676 (1918).
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lina cases fail to refer to the NIL in this situation and apparently treats
those cases decided before its enactment in 1899 no differently from those
decided afterward.8
The principal case concerns failure of consideration, and apparently
the rule relied upon was first announced in Farrington v. McNeill.0
Without discussion or citation of authority, the court in that case simply
concluded its opinion by stating that "it is true, the note in this case is
under seal, which purports a consideration, but such presumption is
rebuttable as between the parties thereto.""' Where the Farrington case
has been cited by our court for this rule, it has always been in a case
treated as one involving a failure of consideration, and not lack of con-
sideration; but the statement of the rule is not so limited on its face.11
Yet it is doubtful whether the rule could have any reasonable application
except to a lack of consideration, for since the use of a seal "imports" a
consideration at the inception of the agreement, it could hardly have any
bearing on the issue of whether consideration actually bargained for
$The basis for the rule in other jurisdictions is NIL § 6(4),vhich provides
that "the validity and negotiable character of an instrument are not affected by the
fact that . . . [it] bears a seal." N. C. Gr.. STAT. § 25-12 (1953). This, the
courts say, makes the sealed note a negotiable instrument within the NIL, and
therefore subject to NIL § 24, which provides that "every negotiable instrument is
deemed prima facie to hare been issued for a valuable consideration," N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-29 (1953), and also to NIL § 28, which provides that "absence or failure
of consideration is a matter of defense as against any person not a holder in due
course." N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-33 (1953). See Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Custis, 153
Md. 235, 239, 138 Atl. 261, 263 (1927), where it is stated that the instrument is
negotiable paper under the uniform act, and "by statutory conversion loses its posi-
tion and quality as a specialty to the extent of both its negotiable characteristics
and of its validity or legal sufficiency as a negotiable instrument."
North Carolina has always declared that a sealed note could be negotiated,
Marsh v. Brooks, 33 N. C. 409 (1850), and therefore would seemingly need not
employ N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-12 (1953) to declare that a sealed note is negotiable;
while in many other jurisdictions, before the NIL, a sealed note was a specialty
(called a 'bill single'), which was non-negotiable. Ex parte First Nat. Bank of
Ozark, 212 Ala. 274, 102 So. 371 (1924) ; Brown v. Jordahl, 32 Minn. 135, 19 N. W.
650 (1884) ; McLaughlin v. Braddy, 63 S. C. 433, 41 S. E. 523 (1901).
In Perry v. First Citizens National Bank & Trust Co., 226 N. C. 667, 40 S. E.
2d 116 (1946), the court cited N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-33 (1953) in support of its
holding that a failure of consideration is a valid defense to a note under seal. The
same result apparently could be reached in cases involving a lack of consideration.
9 174 N. C. 420, 93 S. E. 957 0(1917).
10 Id. at 422, 93 S. E. at 958. Compare this with the language quoted earlier
from Walker v. Walker, 35 N. C. 335 (1852), where the court said consideration
was not necessary to a sealed instrument.
" Patterson v. Fuller, 203 N. C. 788, 167 S. E. 74 (1932). An ideal situation
was presented here for the exact definition of our status regarding lack or failure
of consideration as a defense, as the defendant attempted to construe Burriss v.
Starr, 165 N. C. 651, 81 S. E. 929 (1914), a case involving a lack of consideration,
so as to include a failure of consideration. The court left the situation still in doubt.
Royster v. Hancock, 235 N. C. 110, 69 S. E. 2d 29 (1951) ; Perry v. First Citizens
National Bank & Trust Co., 226 N. C. 667, 40 S. E. 2d 116 (1946) ; Lentz v. John-
son & Sons, Inc., 207 N. C. 614, 178 S. E. 226 (1934).
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has subsequently failed.'2 However this may be, the rule that failure of
consideration is a defense to an action on a sealed promissory note is in
accord with the weight of authority.'3
Although in the Farrington case it was expressly stated that a failure
of consideration was involved, in many cases the court does not state
clearly whether the problem in the particular case involves a lack or a
failure of consideration; and in no case is there any discussion of the
distinction between the two. Since lack of consideration is no defense,
while failure of consideration may be shown in an action on a sealed
note in this jurisdiction, it is felt that an express statement as to which
is being dealt with is needed in each instance. Especially in Lentz v.
Johnson & Sons, Jnc,14 is it questionable whether the court recognized
the difference between a lack and a failure of consideration. There the
plaintiff held notes made by the defendant's brother, and at the plaintiff's
request, so as to make" the situation appear better to the bank examiners,
the defendant signed his name to the notes. It would seem that the
parties never intended any consideration to be present, and therefore a
lack of consideration would be involved, but the court nevertheless ap-
plied its rule as to failure of consideration without any discussion as to
which was present.
Although most of the other jurisdictions deal with sealed promissory
notes under the provisions of the NIL, and consequently treat them
separately from general contracts under seal, 15 there seems to be no
distinction made between the treatment of notes under seal and con-
tracts under seal in this jurisdiction.16 And just as in the case of a note
1 Williston, speaking of contracts under seal, points out that a sharp distinction
must be made between a lack and a failure of consideration since a failure of con-
sideration is a defense to an action on the contract. 1 WiLsasToN, CoNTRAcTs § 109
(Rev. ed., 1936). It seems this would be equally true of a note under seal.
"3 Citizens' Bank of Blakely v. Hall, 179 Ga. 662, 177 S. E. 496 (1934) ; Citi-
zens' Nat. Bank v. Custis, 153 Md. 235, 138 Atl. 261 (1927) (both decided under
the NIL). Shinn et al. v. Stemler, 150 Pa. Super. 350, 45 A. 2d 242 (1946) (de-
cided in absence of NIL). Although several North Carolina cases involving a
failure of consideration cite N. C. GEN. STAT. § 25-33 (1953), see note 8, supra,
apparently little reliance is placed thereon.
"207 N. C. 614, 178 S. E. 226 (1934).
'
5 Ex parte First Nat. Bank of Ozark, 212 Ala. 274, 102 So. 371 (1924). The
court there points out that a sealed note at one time was a specialty, and even when
a state statute provided that the consideration of a sealed instrument could be
attacked, it had no application to sealed notes. It was not until the NIL was
enacted that a sealed note was relieved of the effect of its seal. But see BLACr-
STONE, COMMENTAmS 493 (Gavit ed. 1892), where it is stated that a note "is little
more than an ordinary contract" between the original parties.
18 Apparently notes under seal and contracts under seal are treated interchange-
ably. In Coleman v. Whisnant, 226 N. C. 258, 37 S. E. 2d 693 (1946), the action
was on a contract under seal, and to support its decision that consideration was not
necessary, the court relied upon Harrell v. Watson, 63 N. C. 454 (1869), which in-
volved a bond ( a note under seal), and the Harrell case was in turn aided in its
determination by the fact that a deed needs no consideration. Thomason v. Bescher,
176 N. C. 622, 97 S. E. 654 (1918), dealt with an option, but quoted from the
Harrell case.
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under seal, it appears that lack of consideration is not available as a
defense to a contract under seal. 17  This also remains the view, as re-
gards contracts, in those jurisdictions which have not yet changed by
statute the effect of the seal.' 8
Apparently North Carolina has no cases involving a failure of con-
sideration in the case of a general contract under seal, although the same
criticism made previously with respect to sealed notes is valid here also-
namely, that the court does not indicate that it is aware of the distinction
between a lack and a failure of consideration in these cases involving
sealed instruments. In two cases'9 there were recitals of mutual promises
in the contracts involved, which it seems would involve a failure of
consideration. Nevertheless, the court apparently considered only the
issue of lack of consideration, as it was stated that under "the common
law, which still obtains in this jurisdiction, instruments under seal are
generally held to be good as against a plea by one of the parties of no
consideration, because the seal imports consideration or renders it un-
necessary.' 20  As regards other jurisdictions in the matter of failure of
consideration of a contract, Professor Williston, writing on sealed in-
struments, states that "at the present time there is no doubt that failure
of consideration would everywhere be held a defense."'2 1
In view of the desirability of having a rule that is as -definite in state-
ment and as simple of application as a rule can be, perhaps by applying
our statutes on negotiable instruments to notes under seal we could at
least enjoy the convenience of having only one rule to apply, whether a
lack or a failure of consideration was involved.2 2 We could thereby do
away as well with the burden of having first to decide whether the case
concerns a lack or a failure of consideration. And as for general con-
tracts under seal, perhaps it would not be unwise to join the majority of
states which have already enacted legislation abolishing the distinction
between sealed and unsealed instruments.
23
DONALD R. ERB
17 Crotts v. Thomas, 226 N. C. 385, 38 S. E. 2d 158 (1946) ; Samonds v. Clon-
inger, 189 N. C. 610, 127 S. E. 706 (1925) ; Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N. C. 622,
97 S. E. 654 (1918).8 Wagner v. McClay, 306 Ill. App. 560, 138 N. E. 164 (1923) ; Zirk v. Nohr,
127 N. J. Law 217, 21 A. 2d 766 (1941) ; Poelcher v. Poelcher, 366 Pa. 3, 76 A. 2d
222 (1950) ; Bandy v. Bandy, 187 S. C. 410, 197 S. E. 396 (1938). See RESTATE-
mENT, CoNTRAcrs § 110 (1932); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrS § 217 (Rev. ed. 1936).
10 Coleman v. Whisnant, 226 N. C. 258, 37 S. E. 2d 693 (1946); Basketeria
Stores, Inc. v. Public Indemnity Company, 204 N. C. 537, 168 S. E. 822 (1933).
20 Coleman v. Whisnant, 226 N. C. 258, 260, 37 S. E. 2d 693, 694 (1946).
211 WILLISrON, CONTRAcTS § 109 (Rev. ed. 1936). But see Harvey v. Ryan,
59 W. Va. 134, 53 S. E. 7 (1906), pointing out that failure of consideration is no
defense at common law, but is made so today by statute. Contra: Goodwin v.
Cabot Amusement Co., 129 Me. 36, 149 Atl. 574 (1930), where it is said the de-
fense of failure of consideration is no more potent than that of want of consideration.
2 See statutes and cases cited note 8 supra.
221 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTs § 218 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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